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Community after all?  
An inside perspective on encampment in Haiti 
Alice Corbet 
Summary: This article demonstrates the limits of the camp as a place to live from the point of 
view of displaced people: what is a camp for those who live inside? Why not envisage the camps as 
central place, where life is going on with, or without, the humanitarian help? It studies the 
differences between two different settlements created after the 2010 earthquake. One has been 
formally set-up by NGOs but has ended up being abandoned by the humanitarian organizations due 
to troubles with the inhabitants. The other is a spontaneous settlement that has absorbed 
populations from other camps, and is today in a working condition organised informally by 
inhabitants themselves. In the first case, experiences of community and belonging of the post-
earthquake population seems have been frustrated; in the second case, these sentiments could be an 
explanation of the informal forward projection. Thus, they pass from a liminal statement to a 
central perception. The monographic approach permits to understand the dynamics and the 
identitarian background of the installation in the camps. 
Keywords: Haiti, camps, shantytowns, encampment, community. 
Grasping the borders of encampment and settlement in Haiti from 
the inside 
Starting and ending encampment 
Three years after the earthquake that hit Haiti on January 12, 2010, at least 347,284 displaced 
people were still living in 450 camps, of which 337 are on private land, according to the UN 
Emergency Shelter and Camp Management Cluster (DTM 2013). The continued presence of 
people in camps points to the importance of the encampment process, whereby the move to set 
up camps is associated with a political logic: a logic that controls human life (Verdirame, 
Harrell Bond 2005). The end point of encampment can vary but there is one which is of 
particular interest to us here: that is a shift from a camp to a settlement. How do displaced 
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people modify the place where they live, do they have the support of the ‘humanitarian 
apparatus’ –the fluid humanitarian discourses and practices-, to borrow the term first used by 
Foucault (Pandolfi 2003)? This article’s ethnographic approach uses monographic 
observation1 in order to gain insight into the displaced persons’ feelings and perceptions, as 
well as to take stock of any investments they make in their environment –the camp– and in the 
humanitarian relationship. It allows us to reverse the gaze towards the humanitarian apparatus 
and to explore how NGOs are operating from the camps’ inside point of view: the one of the 
camp residents. 
This article will focus on two different camps whose evolution have been followed between 
2010 and 2013. The profile of the Haitians camps is very diverse. Some benefit from the 
assistance of various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and are highly structured, 
offering the prospect that the displaced people living there may become permanently 
established on the spot: these are the ‘formal’ or ‘regulated’ camps. But in other cases, the 
‘spontaneous’ or ‘informal’ camps may infringe the property rights of the land where they are 
located, and as the NGOs’ resources run out, the poorest are thrown back to their usual means 
of survival: fending for themselves (‘demele’ in Creole). This article will compare two 
adjacent Haitian camps located to the north of the capital, Port-au-Prince: Corail, a formal 
camp, and Canaan, an informal one. It will demonstrate the limits of the camp as a place to 
live in from the point of view of displaced people: what is a camp for those who live inside? 
How can we determine whether it is a place to take refuge, or a place to create a new frame of 
life?I will show that camps can be envisaged as central places that integrate in the urban life 
the ones who have been excluded by poverty and the damage caused by the earthquake. 
When the camps were first created, despite their differences, Corail and Canaan were both 
‘floating spaces’, uncertain places called heterotopia by Foucault (2009:36): ‘other spaces’, 
where people are pushed aside. But unlike the humanitarian apparatus of the formal camp, the 
                                                 
1 This article is the product of three fieldwork sessions of five weeks each carried out between 2011 and 2013 in 
Port-au-Prince, conducted independently alongside consultancy work for Groupe URD and the Delegation fort 
Strategic Affairs (DAS) of the French Defence Ministry. More than 60 informal and semi-informal interviews 
have been done in Port-au-Prince agglomeration, mostly with displaced people (at least 30 of them in Camp 
Mosaique and Canaan) and NGOs actors (6 people). The languages used were Haitian Creole and French. 
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actions of the inhabitants in Canaan are guided by an informal logic. This observation raises 
questions about the camp’s social and urban limits and contributes to regarding its political 
and urban nature, and even about its very identity. 
Thus, this article stresses how the different logics of encampment and ending camps have 
interacted, and even entered into competition. First of all, it presents the general context in 
Haiti and describes the humanitarian apparatus with respect to camps. It then goes on to 
analyze how the ‘formal camp’ of Corail escaped the NGOs’ humanitarian apparatus, 
prompting their departure when they thought it becoming unmanageable, and then how it has 
started to merge with Canaan, its neighbour. Canaan’s informality has gone hand in hand with 
forms of solidarity that allow individual survival because of the survival of the group, and 
which run in parallel with individual strategies. The case of the little informal Mosaique Camp 
is used to illustrate how this situation allowed new groups of displaced people to be integrated 
into the site, after which the settlement dynamics at work in Canaan are analyzed. The 
conclusion emphasises the identity and political dimension of the camp. In contrast with 
Corail, elements of what it could be called a ‘community of condition’ underlie Canaan’s 
functioning, even though the camp is invisible to the government and NGOs precisely because 
of its informality, which makes it fall outside the legal framework. I will explain that this 
‘community of condition’ is made by inhabitants who start with nothing, like “naked people” 
(Agamben 2003), but not without resources: this is their way to solve their lives in precarious 
conditions. 
A disaster in a weak country 
Haiti has distinguished itself as the world’s first independent ‘black´ republic, which arose 
from a slave revolt in 1804.It has gone from being the number one tourist destination in the 
Caribbean in the 1960s to one drained by successive dictatorships and recurring natural 
disasters. According to pre-earthquake figures from 2003, 76% of Haitians live below the 
daily poverty line of US$2, while 55% live beneath the absolute poverty line of US$1 per day 
(UNDP 2004). The livelihoods of the vast majority of the population are based on the 
economics of day-to-day survival, where each person must invent a way to find the food they 
will eat that same evening (De Certeau 1990). In these circumstances, unpredictability is the 
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rule, precariousness the norm. And consequently to the structural weakness of the country and 
instability of the state, this vast and pliable mass of excluded people provides an adjustable 
variable for Haiti’s failing economy and enables the country to function: informality is the 
way to survive for the majority of the Haitians. Yet numerous charitable, religious, medical or 
development organisations support the people of Haiti. The United Nations is present in the 
country since 2004 through the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, better known as 
MINUSTAH, whose mandate has been extended following the 12 January 2010 earthquake. 
The 2010 earthquake, the centre of which was located close to the metropolitan area of Port-
au-Prince, was responsible for the death of tens of thousands of people (the numbers of the 
dead varies from 80 000 to 360 000 (Corbet 2012), the destruction of buildings with the loss of 
many documents, and the displacement of more than 2 million people. It also led to the 
proliferation of external aid, which has proved difficult to channel and coordinate. The 1500 
camps that sprung up in few days in January 2010 were gradually organized by their residents 
or through the actions of NGOs which distributed water, food and tarpaulins, installed latrines, 
ran health clinics, etc. Many of their inhabitants were granted internally displaced person 
(IDP) status, thereby giving them rights (DTM 2013). 
Initially, most of the inhabitants of the camps were people who had lost their homes, but the 
presence of humanitarian aid and the prospect of access to land in the city centre attracted 
certain people from very poor areas who sometimes moved from shantytowns neglected by the 
Haitian state to camps managed by international agencies. Some people living outside the 
capital were also attracted by the new urban neighbourhoods that grew out of the earthquake, 
continuing the trend towards urban drift that has gone hand-in-hand with the gradual 
impoverishment of Haiti’s rural areas (Paul, Dameus, Garrabe 2010; Oliver-Smith 2010). 
Nonetheless, as the months went by, humanitarian aid progressively dried up, and only those 
who had no other option were left in the camps, where the living conditions steadily 
deteriorated, particularly during the rainy season and with the arrival of cholera towards the 
end of 2010. At the time of my last fieldwork, in 2013, a mixture of very poor people and of 
those who had lost everything remained in the camps, benefiting from humanitarian aid to a 
greater or lesser extent, according to where they lived. 
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Corail Camp: the humanitarian imposition  
Building a camp in the desert 
Corail is located 15 kilometres north of Port-au-Prince, in area that is virtually desert area. The 
camp opened in April 2010 and has two parts, Corail Cesselesse and Corail Sector 3, spread 
over approximately 25 hectares. In the space of a few days it received as many as 10,000 
people from camps that had reached saturation point in the centre of the city, including the 
Petion-Ville Golf Club, an up-market area located in the hills above Port-au-Prince. 
The camp was created at the request of the United States army, in spite of the reluctance of the 
Haitian government and many NGOs, who questioned the appropriateness of creating a camp 
on that particular spot (World Vision 2011; Katz, AP 2010). As well as its distance from the 
capital and its very arid climate, the district is liable to flooding in the rainy season. Moreover, 
the area, which had previously been known as Titanyen, was a place renowned for summary 
executions during the dictatorship of François and Jean-Claude Duvalier. It was also the spot 
where, for practical reasons, the communal graves that were dug following the earthquake are 
located. We'll see how the setting up of Corail in this area has caused many problems, like the 
end of the camp and a stalemate situation for its inhabitants. 
Corail was put together in a very rational way, and administered by various NGOs with 
responsibility for its management with the aim of meeting emergency needs as best they 
could. Its design followed the very precise recommendations contained in camp management 
toolkits, which specify the best way to build and administer camps based on functional 
criteria: dividing the camp into blocks, assessment on the basis of a ‘typical’ family of the 
number of square meters for each home, of litres of water per person, number of latrines, etc 
(UNHCR 2007; UNDP/IAPSO 2009). Was it intended to offer a site for temporary shelter, or 
to create a model town based on the assumption of a ‘community’ created by the encampment, 
as was suggested by several officials, including PresidentPréval, who stated that in Corail, 
‘roads and infrastructure will be built, like a real community’ (Haiti Libre 2010)? 
The “toolkit” design of Corail is the same as in other formal camps, but is more evidently 
visible because the camp is far from the city. Its management, only focused on the body needs, 
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has resulted in a camp that soon gave its inhabitants the impression that they were being 
subjected to encampment by an external supervision rather than being assisted along the road 
to reconstruction. Indeed, protests soon arose regarding the provision of aid and the difficulties 
associated with life in such a hostile location. When a storm devastated Corail in July 2010, 
the first rumblings of discontent were heard: ‘A few people in charge of NGOs present when it 
all began quickly left in order to save their skins –a fact that was not appreciated by the 
victims. “It’s obvious that they’ve sent us here to die”, they said bitterly with regard to the 
Government and NGOs’ (Le Nouvelliste 2010). The camp’s isolation cut its inhabitants off 
from work opportunities available on the informal urban market, making them dependent on 
humanitarian hand-outs. When payment for cleaning latrines was halted in summer 2010, 
there was further tension. For one NGO head ‘paying for basic maintenance risks damaging 
people’s self-respect […]. Security and cleaning need to be taken care of free of charge and 
voluntarily in order to consolidate a sense of community’. This view –not applied in other 
camps– called into question the very meaning of the intervention: how can an organisation 
‘expect people who are hungry to work for free?’ asked another camp administrator (Haiti 
Libre 2010)? 
In this tense atmosphere, certain leaders adopted a classic strategy for gaining power in a 
humanitarian context and became influential in Corail thanks to their ability to interact with 
NGOs and the world of the blan (‘foreigner’ in Creole). Those who spoke English or French, 
who understood the humanitarian apparatus and who knew how to respond to its expectations 
–those who have social capital and agency- were particularly successful. Indeed, all the 
leaders that I have interviewed were in a position of authority before they arrived in the camp, 
either through religious, economic, charismatic, or violent influences. Even though they were 
not always camp residents and were not genuinely representative of the population, these 
leaders were accepted by the inhabitants, who saw in them the only way to be heard (Harrell 
Bond, Voutira 2007). Some of them have sometimes even exacerbated problems, or have 
over-victimised the displaced, playing up to the clichéd image of passive displaced people in 
order to demand more aid (Napier-Moore 2005: 13). 
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These intermediaries, known as ‘community leaders/mobilizers/managers’ in the humanitarian 
jargon, were also watched by the displaced people since their interaction with the world of the 
blan meant that they were suspected of making personal gain from their collaboration rather 
than working for the collective benefit, and particularly of siphoning off money and goods. It 
is true that these leaders often had an interest in finding work and earning social prestige. That 
is why other displaced persons, labelled as ‘troublemakers’ by the NGOs, set themselves up in 
opposition to them, making it even harder for outside bodies to understand Corail’s internal 
dynamics. There was therefore a quick subjectification of some of the IDPs, who adopted 
personal and often opportunistic tactics to succeed and increased the differentiations and 
divisions within the camp. This, in time, allowed the population of Corail to come together 
around two main concerns: either cooperation with NGOs, or opposition to them. 
At the same time, transitional shelters were built to replace the earlier hurricane-resistant tents. 
These T-shelters, which are made of imported wood and have a life span of 3 – 5 years if they 
are well maintained, were initially rejected by the IDPs because they were considered too 
small and because they confirmed the half-temporary, half-permanent status of their presence 
in Corail. Nonetheless, the camp has gradually become transformed into a ‘village’ made up of 
thousands of shelters laid out in straight lines, like other urban camps that have been 
earmarked as transitional sites (Salome 2012). 
When camp residents oppose the camp and their designated community  
Generally speaking, the exclusion of the inhabitants from projects intended for their benefit 
and the uncertainty over the camp’s future strengthened the dependent power relationship on 
the humanitarian institutions that IDPs already had to put up due to the precariousness of their 
situation. The complete break in the humanitarian relationship was prompted by the increasing 
gulf between the humanitarian apparatus and IDPs, when an NGO attempted to establish a 
micro-business programme in Corail. Rumours, spread by ‘troublemakers’ among a 
population predisposed to consider ‘humanitarians’ as being responsible for their difficulties 
for the reasons exposed before, grew up around the way that the beneficiaries of financial 
support had been selected. They said mostly that there was partiality. Demonstrations bringing 
together several hundred IDPs took place in Petion-Ville in April 2012. They were very well 
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organised: buses were hired to transport the demonstrators, suggesting that Corail had been 
used to further one side in the Haitian political debate and disagreements about the massive 
presence of the international community. The camp managers and their NGOs interpreted 
these demonstrations as a betrayal and, since they could no longer control Corail or ensure the 
security of humanitarian personnel, who were sometimes threatened, they withdrew from the 
camp in the summer of 2012. 
The IDPs - who, above all, wanted greater clarity about the NGOs’ programmes, pointing to 
their lack of coherence and unfairness - were able to be manipulated to the point where they 
completely rejected the humanitarian intervention. Yet they felt that the NGOs had abandoned 
them and were punishing them because they had not been ‘good beneficiaries’. Since then, 
Corail has existed without any regular supply of treated water to prevent cholera, even if 
treated water is one of the major preoccupation of the NGOs, and a way to identify which are 
the camps helped by them (formal camps) and which are the other informal camps! Then, 
people buy water in small quantities, making it more expensive as well as being time-
consuming and incurring a high social cost, so that some people end up using untreated water. 
What is more, the latrines have been closed down. 
At the time of the Corail revolt, the supposed community of displaced people exploded simply 
because it never existed: Haitian society is highly fragmented (Corbet, Groupe URD 2012), 
and IDPs are divided up into small family groups coming from various walks of life. That is 
why Corail has created multiple forms of resistance and its inhabitants rebelled against the 
only community that existed for them: the unspecified international community, so undefined 
in a theoretical sense (Lachmann 2011) but so poignantly concrete for Haitians, and which 
they sometimes describe as ‘disguised occupation’. Moreover, by seeking to help the other in a 
biopolitical mode (Foucault 2004), the humanitarian intervention in Corail paradoxically 
reduced these same people to a passive form of existence. Via the status of ‘beneficiary’ that is 
intrinsic to being an IDP, the international community put the displaced population in the 
collective position of being a needy community so that the emergence of individual 
subjectivities, political claims, and even the manipulation of IDPs living in camps, were either 
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ignored or were seen as an attack on humanitarianism (same similar cases have been studied 
by Nyers 2006, Agier 2010). 
Events in Corail therefore confirm the existence of external humanitarian actors’ assumptions, 
as well as the inflexibility of the heads of the humanitarian apparatus and the dynamics of 
confrontation that they provoke. As Turner indicates (2014), “a main assumption in 
community development and capacity building projects is that ‘real’ refugees are non-
political. (…) The projects assume that once the refugees are empowered or given voice, they 
will act in the (objective) interest of ‘the community’”. Thus, “ignoring power and politics, 
relief agencies are ignorant of what actually goes on in the camps”. In this space of 
alienation, Turner concludes, “every action and every interpretation is political, so 
paradoxically it is the depoliticisation that creates the politicisation”. 
The IDPs’ revolt reveals the malfunctioning of the humanitarian apparatus which, by 
assigning the label ‘community’ to a camp, creates a totalitarian illusion that echoes 
Agamben’s (2003) ideas: that of a space managed in a rigid and authoritarian way. The case of 
CoraiI demonstrates, however, that IDPs are not crushed by absolute power over bare life. 
Agamben’s space of exception - a paradigm of absolute power exerted over life itself - rapidly 
enters into confrontation with social evolution. The exception is of more significance to 
humanitarians than to displaced people themselves, thereby creating points of friction. A 
camp’s day-to-day ‘care and maintenance’ intended to manage IDPs’ basic needs is 
incompatible with the life that is created there and with local dynamics (Turner, 2005, p.313). 
It even runs counter to Haitian-style day-to-day fending for oneself since it prevents 
flexibility, and instead imposes administrative rigidity. Yet life in the camp is as much about 
displacement as emplacement (Agier 2002b). Since the NGOs left, most of the IDPs have 
rented out or resold their T-shelters, or adapted them and planted trees. Some of them have 
started restaurants and small shops in the vicinity of the camp. Others have organised tap-tap 
routes –public transport– from the camp entrance into the greater Port-au-Prince area. 
The case of Corail is an example of a camp whose planning forgot social dynamics. It shows 
how a humanitarian perspective, that ignores displaced people as social and political subjects, 
is at odds with their aspirations. Humanitarian principles are applied at the expense of the 
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social context: as if displaced people, just like the camp itself, are a-historic. This approach 
has deprived Corail’s IDPs of their life histories, their networks, and their ability to participate 
or to resist. It has been reinforced by the purely technical –even hygienic– approach to camp 
management that is based on the fusion of political and biological life and on the 
legitimisation of rights in the name of the suffering body. In other words, displaced people’s 
biolegitimacy (the legitimacy based on the body, Fassin 2000), granted by their IDP status, has 
taken precedence over social adaptability. Thus, while the various toolkits used to organise 
Corail are supposed to alleviate suffering during the emergency period, their lack of flexibility 
and humanity resembles a form of external control over the precariousness of human existence 
which fails to ensure the camp’s transition in such a way that its inhabitants can rebuild more 
normal, autonomous and dignified ways of life. 
Since the NGOs left, Corail’s IDPs have been trapped in a dead-end: that of a camp no one 
knows what to do with. As in the refugee camps where there is no possible return and where 
the temporary turns into an eternity, there is no way out of the camp and its inhabitants remain 
in a precarious state of endless encampment. The T-shelters have now started to disintegrate, 
yet there is still no long-term rehousing solution for the IDPs. Although responsibility for the 
camp has been passed on to the local commune of Croix-des-Bouquets, President Michel 
Martelly’s government, elected in 2011, continues to deliberately neglect the camp that was 
created by his predecessor. Corail’s displaced population therefore hesitates either to set up 
home there permanently or to leave for another place where they can have more influence on 
their destiny, as if they were closed-in spatially and morally in a temporary ‘camp shape’ with 
no one knowing what will become of it. In order to open up the possibility of something other 
than just waiting, they use various strategies to interact with the neighbouring site of Canaan. 
For instance, families split up, some keeping the Corail T-shelter, while others go to reserve a 
space in Canaan. Whereas previously they looked to the urban centre of Port-au-Prince, they 
now see their informal neighbour as a unit that might offer them a livelihood. In this way, the 
IDPs try to make the most of the advantages offered by both sites. Observation shows that in 
some formal camps, the unity shaped by the experience of joining a camp stops functioning. 
The IDPs are then attracted by the near-by informal camp, whose cohesion –which we will 
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subsequently refer to as the ‘community of condition’– allows life projects to be successfully 
carried out. 
Canaan, a vast but ‘invisible’ camp  
The informal organisation of encampment 
Some of the first inhabitants of Canaan explained to me how they arrived in the area. In 
January 2010, the vast area around Corail was still virtually uninhabited, but following the 
devastation caused by the earthquake, a few displaced people moved there due to the lack of 
space in the city. They were joined there by hundreds of other households after April 2010 
when a decree signed by President Preval declared 5,000 hectares to the north of Port-au-
Prince ‘of public utility’ (Le Moniteur 2010). This decree was intended to allow IDPs to come 
to live outside the city, where land pressure was intense and where rental prices increased a 
lot, squeezing out the poorest. This is a common phenomena in Haiti, where the poor rural 
people arrive in cities (rural exodus) that are not prepared to welcome them, which then create 
new precarious districts in or outside the city: slums that became “rurbanisation” districts. For 
example, in response to the question ‘where would you go if you had to leave the camp?’, 53% 
of IDPs in the camps within the city answered ‘I don’t know’ (OIM-Acted 2011: 4). The area 
therefore appeared to offer a solution to many of the displaced following the closure of a 
number of camps in 2011 and 2012. The site, renamed Canaan after a place of worship that 
was located there, has since filled up, whilst the metropolitan area has become less congested. 
A few NGOs had operated in Canaan during the early stages, but they quickly withdrew once 
the emergency phase came to an end. They were waiting for the legal status of the site, which 
was contested by the owners who were seeking compensation, to be sorted out. Haiti’s land 
ownership system is highly complex and it is often hard to understand who owns a piece of 
land given the various historical and legal twists, both formal and informal, it has been subject 
to (Oriol, Dorner 2012). Everyone was waiting for the government to give more indications as 
to its intentions for the area. Moreover, Canaan received groups of people who were often 
abandoned because they were very poor: the internally excluded whom Zygmunt Bauman has 
crudely described as ‘human waste’ (Bauman 2004). By way of example, two thirds of the 
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inhabitants of Canaan interviewed during my fieldwork were born outside the capital and had 
migrated to Port-au-Prince at the time of the earthquake where they were living in precarious 
rental accommodation in shantytowns. Just under half had no identification documents –lost or 
not given by a corrupted and enfeebled administration-, which prevents them from having 
access to various aspects of citizenship such as administrative procedures or care, and makes 
them stateless in their own country (Kaelin 2010), like the stateless ‘outside the law’ (Arendt 
1972: 253). Bearing in mind that it brings together some of the most excluded sectors of 
Haitian society, and that it was ignored by both NGOs and the government whilst it was 
growing, we can say that Canaan has been invisible to the authorities and humanitarian 
apparatus. Their attention was instead focused on the most central and visible of the camps, 
such as those in the wealthy areas or located in front of the presidential palace. Yet when at 
the end of 2012 it was estimated that 54,045 people were living in one part of Canaan 
(DTM 2012), international observers put forward the figure of more than 150,000.Different 
neighbourhoods have grown up according to where the IDPs came from, as they often arrived 
together when a camp in the city was closed. The names of these areas are biblical, such as 
Canaan I, II, III, IV, V, Jerusalem and New Jerusalem, Village Grace de Dieu, etc., a reminder 
that Haiti is replete with religious references (Hurbon 2004) and that Canaan is also 
considered a ‘Promised land’ for the displaced. Indeed, a lot of churches lead faith-based 
market in Canaan, in order to develop their dominance on the area. One of the districts, which 
we will come back to later, is known as Mosaique Camp. 
The first people to arrive in Canaanestablished committees, as was often the case in the camps 
in the cities. Although they are supposed to be representative, these committees are often self-
appointed. Their members manage a given space, dividing into various groups managing 
water, the environment, security, and so on. They create a local administration of the space 
and people, as “self made men” or “big men” (Médard 1992), has most of them had done 
before the earthquake on their previous environment. These committees have multiplied in 
camps where the early humanitarian interventions promoted the emergence of community 
leaders, who presented themselves to outside institutions as the camp’s main spokespersons, at 
the risk that –as in Corail– they fail to present the truth about the difficulties in the field. The 
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heads of the committees in Canaan are often former leaders of districts in Port-au-Prince who 
command respect because of the sometimes violent control they exerted over their old 
territories. Such is the case of Manuel (a pseudonym), who heads one of the oldest areas of 
Canaan. After being abandoned by his parents when they migrated to the capital, he lived in 
the very poor and violent neighborhood of Cité Soleil, mixing with chimères, armed militias 
that sowed terror during the Aristide dictatorship. After the earthquake, he heard an 
acquaintance talk about Canaan and decided to go there in order to ‘leave the hell of Cité 
Soleil‘. Since March 2010, he has been organising the area and has jointly founded the 
associations that have grown up there. Although he did so as part of a strategy to create and 
preserve his own personal power, he has since tried to manage the site just like a mayor 
concerned for the general welfare of his district –knowing that his success will guarantee his 
personal position. 
Like him, the other people in charge of the committees in Canaan appear to be aware of what 
is at stake in the creation of a new ‘ideal’ neighbourhood and its development. ‘We’ve 
organised ourselves so that we are strong. We decided to make peace with each other through 
the organisations so that we do not end up fighting’, said one leader. For example, in one of 
the areas, young men who ‘caused problems’ were thrown out in order to maintain security. 
Manuel added ‘We do not want Canaan to become a ghetto like elsewhere. We are helping the 
state reduce the overcrowding in the city’ (interviews in September 2012). A Presidential 
Commission to Build Canaan has also been created, which each new arrival must pay money 
for collective infrastructure. These facilities have never been built, but the Commission has 
managed to impose its authority out of fear and the hope arising from its status. Moreover, in 
most of the neighbourhoods, the heads of the committees express suspicion about any external 
project, including any of the state’s, which was still absent from the site in 2013.This situation 
allows the leaders to protect their community, but also to manage their districts alone. They 
often stress their independence from humanitarian interventions: such a stance reassures them 
in the face of the feeling of rejection by the humanitarian presence in the country, which we 
will not go into here, but which is very widespread and can be summed up by the notion that 
‘humanitarians get rich off our backs’. This independence also places a value on people’s 
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dignity, which is often swept aside by projects done to the species-body, a power focused on 
man-as-species (Foucault 1997). Aid is accepted primarily when it comes from religious 
bodies, when it is one-off, and above all, when it can be controlled. But this independence is 
also a means, for some groups, to impose their authority and their control over certain markets 
that develop (particularly the rental market), and even to extend their network of influence 
with a view to furthering political ambitions. For competing groups headed by local 
strongmen, the emergence of Canaan is viewed as a new opportunity for territorial control. 
Canaan is therefore a place born of the gradual arrival of people who have come looking for a 
piece of land, a shelter and hope. As it has grown, the rental market has grown with it, as well 
as many food stores or construction depots, restaurants, and so on. Some infrastructure has 
been installed: electricity has been pirated from the road under the direction of local leaders as 
Manuel, increasing their popularity and enabling them to charge its users. Privately-managed 
water cisterns have been built, and roads have been marked out and named so that the water 
lorries can fill them. Trees were distributed to the inhabitants in March 2011, and everyone 
was encouraged to plant food crops, providing some shade for the site. A private health centre, 
equipped with a scanner, has even been opened, even though it is too expensive for most of 
the local population. Churches with schools attached to them have sprung up. Religious 
leaders gain the loyalty of their flock, then start a private school to which the children of the 
faithful are sent, a scheme which ensures the religious leaders’ wealth, often at the expense of 
their parishioners and the quality of teaching (Hurbon 2004). 
While the site’s apparent anarchy seems hard to decode from an external viewpoint, the people 
in Canaan have nonetheless organised themselves in such a way as to create a coherent way of 
life. They have made sense of it and have made a production of locality (Appadurai 1996). To 
sum it up in a single phrase, the ‘community of condition’ cobbled together in Canaan, despite 
all its constraints, allows displaced people to muddle through and therefore take possession of 
the land in order to carry out their life projects. 
But only the wealthiest, who often have a stable job in the private sector, and who have been 
attracted by the space available in Canaan, have the means to live well there, by building a 
latrine, for instance. The remaining majority must work in the informal sector, starting small 
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businesses on the spot or going back and forth to Port-au-Prince. Moreover, Canaan’s 
organisation makes up for the lack of any official structures. When Hurricane Isaac struck in 
2012, the heads of the committees in Canaan took on the work of the commune of Croix-des-
Bouquets by organising the distribution of first aid kits. Thus, the informal took over from the 
formal, with the latter able to reach in an emergency an area that is neglected the rest of the 
time. 
From the city to Canaan: the trajectory of Mosaique Camp 
The invasion of the land around Canaan and the sporadic cohesion that made it possible can be 
illustrated by the example of Cite Mosaique Camp. From the very evening of the disaster, 
some 130 households whose homes had been destroyed in the commune of Delmas, the 
economic centre of greater Port-au-Prince, established themselves on a small space used as a 
football pitch. A leader took charge in what became known as ‘CitéMosaique’: the mosaic 
alluded to by its name was with respect to the diversity of people present on the site, while 
Cité, in Creole, means ‘ghetto’ or ‘shantytown’.He had a water cistern built inside the camp, 
as well as some latrines and collective showers, and he interacted with a few NGOs that from 
time to time distributed treated water, medicines, etc. At the heart of the camp was a small 
space that became its social centre, recalling the traditional lakou (areas of social life often 
located in the middle of plots belonging to families or groups of families).Thus, in Cite 
Mosaique, as in other spontaneous camps, ‘there was a strong determination on the part of the 
survivors[…].During the time they lived in make-shift shelters, they showed a great capacity 
for improvisation in terms of construction, how community life was organized and more 
generally in the survival strategies that were adopted ‘ (Davis 2012: 5). 
The example of the small Mosaique Camp demonstrates how IDPs organised themselves 
without any dependence on the state or international organisations. Solidarity was born out of 
necessity, and solidarity enabled survival. The precariousness of the situation they shared 
encouraged them to have a feeling of cohesion. But landownership pressures on the camp 
increased. Its internal climate deteriorated and the overcrowding gave rise to a squalid 
environment. In May 2012, all the shelters measured less than 15m² for households composed 
of an average of 8 people! Two children caught cholera. In the spring of 2012, the Delmas 
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town council offered US$ 125 per family to get the IDPs to leave. Having heard about Canaan, 
an ‘Eldorado’ where, rumour had it, there was a chance of acquiring ownership, and having 
nowhere else to go, one group left for Canaan at the end of April, just before Cité Mosaique 
was violently evicted by militia working for a supposed landowner who wanted to recover this 
space in the middle of the city (Amnesty International 2013). Eventually, the new camp was 
built on the edge of Canaan, close to the national road leading to the north of the island. The 
chief surrounded the site with barbed wire, staked out an area for the shelters and another for a 
small football pitch, and cleared away the refuse from the former hospital waste disposal site 
on which the camp was built. That was how Mosaique Camp came into being (no longer 
‘Cite’), far off the beaten track, with only the proximity of the sea and the road running 
alongside it as assets. 
The camp committee, made up of 12 men and women, attempted to establish a micro-credit 
project. The 200 inhabitants all contributed towards getting water-trucks to come to fill the 
reservoir with (untreated) water for the camp. They bought a boat, and a fisherman was 
recruited to provide the inhabitants with fish. No school was set up because the necessary 
skills were not there: those who could, sent their children to Port-au-Prince to live with close 
relatives. After few months, they started to send them to the new schools of Canaan. But, as 
Camp Mosaique is in the margins of Canaan and because the road to go there is very long and 
difficult, the children mostly stayed in the camp, without any education. The camp population 
became overwhelmingly female and young, because the men worked in town during the week, 
and because the camps brought together the most vulnerable. Everyone else found alternatives 
ways out. So, in September 2012, Mosaique Camp was half adult (about 10% of inhabitants 
were grown men and 40% women), and the other half was made up of young children under 
12: 30% were aged between 6 and 12, and 20% from 0 to 5 years old. Most of the women had 
no work, and most of the households in the camp were eating only one meal a day. Despite 
their vulnerability and the precariousness of their situation, they tried to make improvements 
to their living space in order to gain more privacy and make it more resistant to the unceasing 
wind and frequently torrential rains. 
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Because of their precarious situation, the initial solidarity that had been the key to better 
survival was not invested to the same extent in the camp’s common welfare: in Haiti, 
‘individualism never finds its partner in the community’ (Labadie 2013). Not because 
individualism carries more weight, but because it is necessary in Haiti, where the idea of a 
‘nation’ owes more to a pro-independence reading of history than to a social body (Corbet, 
Groupe URD 2012). Tensions rose. For instance, some people did not accept that those who 
did not pay for water should have any, and the fishermen sold off their boats and disappeared. 
The chief had to manage these disagreements by ‘playing’ on popular beliefs, notably by 
resting his authority on the belief in lougarous, evil night-time spirits that attack children in 
particular, and which would punish those who behave badly in the camp. As of mid-2013, 
Camp Mosaique still had a very poor and precarious existence. No one had been able to save 
enough to build a solid shelter. The inhabitants, despite their shared history, felt liable to be 
evicted at any moment. But they persisted in claiming the space, which has become their only 
life option, so that Mosaique Camp has become a new district of Canaan. 
From informal invasion to occupied land 
In spite of the differences in people’s situations in Canaan, the invasion of the land was based 
on individual and collective tactics for claiming the space: forming committees, fixing the 
boundaries of plots of land, building homes, looking after small gardens, dividing into 
districts. These forms of land invasion in Canaan, as is true of the way land has been 
developed, are not new in Haiti. Even the creation of shantytowns with an impetus from the 
state has happened many times before. Cité Soleil - initially known as Cite Simone, after the 
name of the wife of the former dictator François Duvalier - was created in this way. Similarly, 
Canaan is sometimes called Cité Sophia Martelly, after the name of the wife of the current 
President. Does that then mean it will be transformed into a shantytown? 
As it stands, Canaan is not simply an ‘incomplete, unfinished form of urbanity’ (Agier 2002b: 
337), it is above all an inchoate city-camp, floating between two states: between the town and 
the camp, and between de facto autonomy and dependence on decisions about its status. 
Moreover, with time, this location, which had previously been neglected in the days when it 
was the infamous Titanyen, has become attractive, as it demonstrated by a few sumptuous 
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villas that have been built by wealthy people who sense that the site might become a fully-
fledged area of Port-au-Prince. Today, Canaan is therefore a potential town: a city in the 
making, a naked city (Agier 2002b), where people are living like in a normal Haitian town, but 
without any administrative consideration or urban planning from the authorities. A place 
where there is no regalian power, just the creations made by the invasion and the installation 
of the IDPs. 
After being occupied by people who came to live there in 2010 or more recently, as in the case 
of Mosaique Camp, the field study shows that Canaan is more than a spontaneous camp: it is a 
place of encampment. This means that the land there has been organised, given names and 
projected into the future, as with ‘urban dwellers in the making’ (Pérouse de Montclos, 
Kagwanja 2000: 206). Canaan is composed of a hotchpotch of different groups with varying 
objectives. Like a shantytown, it is a hybrid town made up of houses built with tarpaulins or 
cement. At best, Canaan may offer legal access to land ownership, and at the very least, the 
chance to rebuild a house or run a business for a certain amount of time. This huge informal 
camp is also seen to provide an opportunity for many of its inhabitants, which is why it has 
become much more about politics and urban development than humanitarianism. The 
international community has, moreover, started to ask questions about Canaan’s existence and 
future, encouraging the Haitian state to show some concern about what the site might become 
in the future. The state is in fact said to be engaged in reshaping Canaan, with plans for 
building basic infrastructure(Ayiti kale Je 2013).Even though the public utility area was 
created by presidential decree, these plans –still only on the drawing board– would result in 
the eviction (the deguerpissement) of many IDPs, who are considered ‘squatters’. Yet they are 
likely to rise up against the state taking over ‘their’ Canaan: ‘this is not a camp, it is where I 
live’, one of them said in September 2012. 
What will the future of Canaan be? For the Haitian government, the actual state of affairs will 
require regulation that will be all the more difficult to introduce since Canaan’s informality 
has allowed time for various actors to make their mark, particularly since it has allowed 
groups of people to introduce their lifestyle with complete autonomy and so will be difficult to 
curb. Some observers claim that the Canaan area (which has gradually expanded to include 
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Corail) is already the largest shantytown in the greater Port-au-Prince area. This voluntary 
neglect is symptomatic of the usual ‘laisser-faire’ of Haitian leaders. It is as if Canaan were 
‘the physical embodiment of the national reconstruction strategy based on self-build’ (Noël 
Groupe URD 2012: 5): a strategy that allows the forgotten part of the population to fend for 
itself –so long as they do not cause any problems. Yet Canaan’s lack of management also 
raises a security issue: it could become transformed into a shantytown blighted by the 
committees that might turn into gangs, or its inhabitants could rise up against the 
government’s plans. While waiting for a determination about his future, Canaan remains in a 
state of exception because it is invisible to the government and to NGOs and due to its unclear 
legal status and the uncertainty surrounding its future. Its inhabitants feel a strong sense of 
insecurity, which forces them to continue to muddle through day-by-day, even though they 
make some investments, such as strengthening their homes, thereby betting on the future. 
While it is still an informal settlement, Canaan is no longer a camp in people’s discourse, yet it 
continues to be one in terms of its precariousness. 
The identitarian background of informal encampment 
Corail’s planned space seems to have failed compared to Canaan, whose invasion is 
illustrative of the passage from the logic of a camp to one of population, resembling an urban 
genesis. The vast informal camp has seen the emergence of a shared awareness of belonging to 
the same place (or feeling of belonging): whose inhabitants now call themselves ‘Canaéens’, 
give names to the roads, go to churches, have shops... It is reasonable to put forward the idea 
of a sort of community of misfortune and condition brought about by the earthquake, which 
was the founding moment for Haitian camps. Since the disaster was very sudden, people were 
mixed up during the emergency period, particularly in camps. That moment still remains in 
Haitians’ discourse as one of the rare moments when all social classes came together (Corbet 
2012). That equalisation of living conditions between what are generally impenetrable strata 
of Haitian society, even though it was only temporary, was one of the first elements 
contributing to the fiction of coherence that grew up after the earthquake. Since then, the 
memory of the camp’s founding has remained strong, even though the earthquake was not 
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always the reason people moved there. There is therefore an identity-like affiliation, real or 
fictitious, to this ‘community of condition’. It allows the IDPs to make sense of their situation, 
sometimes demanding the government and NGOs’ attention by referring to this initial event, 
aware of their image as ‘absolute victims’ (Rancière 1995). According to several interviews 
carried out in the course of this study, the scattering of people that followed the closure of 
some camps and the sprinkling of housing solutions throughout the metropolitan area is a 
mistake. In dispersing the camp’s population, their unity, which was the factor giving them 
coherence and which provided the basis for them to be able to build new ways of living 
together, has been taken away. 
However, this form of solidarity cannot be considered the same as a ‘community’ in the sense 
often used by humanitarian organisations, which define it according to spatial criteria, making 
it synonymous with a shared identity. It is too restricted in time and it does not show in the 
daily life of the camp, where individualism takes precedence despite belonging to the same 
place. Yet nonetheless this ‘community of condition’ calls into question the camp as a place 
defined by its history, like a partial community spirit. There is a process of belonging in the 
claims made by displaced of living in a camp that links their personal history with the 
collective one (Malkki 1995). Like a small entities who are linked by  « these territoriality 
links find their expression in production and commercialization as well as in cultural and 
social activities"2 : relatives, neighbours, people engaged in economic interdependence 
(Anglade 1974: 211)… 
In other words, the earthquake provides a strong liminal reference point that legitimates their 
presence in the camp and their right to ‘own’ it. It can also allow room for fending for oneself 
and for autonomy. Concretely, this is expressed through an architectural transition: tarpaulins 
give way to cement. People or groups of people who were strangers at the beginning, have 
started to come together in economic, social and friendship networks: moun pa. In Canaan, for 
example, the displaced Haitians have created order out of the initial disorder. They no longer 
always need to leave the camp, which increasingly provides employment solutions and is 
                                                 
2 Translated from french by the author: « Ces liens de territorialité qui s'expriment autant au niveau de la 
production et de la commercialisation qu'au niveau des activités sociales et culturelles ». 
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dotted with small shops, churches and schools. Even though still set apart, Canaan is 
Foucault’s heterotopia incarnate and has become inhabited. It is not a situation of exclusion, in 
a camp where they cannot live by themselves, but a “rurbanisation” process. It is an 
incarnation of the prediction of Anglade who shows that slums are the future of Port-au-
Prince, because this is where life and dynamics can be developed, without the restrictive 
governmental regulation (Anglade 1991, cited by Duval 2013). 
The contrast with Corail is stark, where only the bare bones of the informal town-dwelling that 
is to be found in Canaan can be observed. Yet it is there that the basic infrastructure lacking in 
Canaan is to be found: latrines, water for all, etc. But even if, from a distance, the T-shelters 
give the impression of a multi-coloured village –albeit one that is laid out in straight lines–
Corail remains in a state of complete indecision and its inhabitants are ‘stuck’ in the formal 
camp. They have been cut off by the humanitarian apparatus, which has deprived them of the 
means of ‘owning’ the land, of standing together and creating forms of solidarity that enable 
them to become organised. Hence the Corail IDPs remain in a state of dependence due to the 
uncertainty surrounding the fate of the place where they live, without the ability to organise it 
in the meantime. They must, moreover, leave the camp in order to be able to subsist in the 
camp. Yet, rather than living a bare life, they have challenged the humanitarian apparatus that 
has denied their emergence as political beings. But because of Corail’s rigid ‘camp shape’ 
they have not been able to build a coherent living space as in Canaan. The ‘community of 
condition’ that is visible in Canaan –even if it is sporadic and opportunistic– has been 
undermined in Corail by the humanitarian apparatus. By insisting on a ‘community’ that is 
believed to be created through the process of setting up a camp, and which is supposed to be 
needy but willing, and in imposing its management over the species-body, the humanitarian 
apparatus has increased the fragmentation, even leading to competition, among its inhabitants. 
This can be summed up, from an internal point of view, by saying that in Corail, the 
humanitarian logic has gone against the camp. 
These examples remind us that the history of the camp is one of a multitude of personal 
histories, of the way its inhabitants put effort into the camp or fail to do so, and the 
adaptability or not of the humanitarian apparatus. Over and above the non-place (Augé 1992) 
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and even the off-site (‘hors lieux’ Agier 2002b, 2012), the camp should therefore be analysed 
beyond the logistics of its creation and its pure material existence. It is a place that evolves 
over time, constantly being reshaped, whose inhabitants try to build a future for themselves 
rather than staying in a temporary state that is particular to camps. Camps therefore deserve to 
be seen as central places at the heart of strategies of space, power and identity - places where 
people from the ‘country beyond’ (the mounsayo, i.e. the peasants and, by extension, all of the 
very poor (Barthélémy 1990)), whose hidden presence has become visible, are inserted into 
urban life. Although the inhabitants of Canaan, for instance, remain in a state of exception, 
abandoned by the government in particular, and even though the area is peripheral, located in-
between two liminal states (Von Gennep 1909), the site nonetheless resembles a space at the 
heart of an urban and social construction. What makes the Canaan model attractive is the 
cohesiveness of its community and the possibilities that exist there. The site allows 
investments to be made there, unlike Corail. Thus, one type of camp absorbs another. Being 
drawn together by the ‘community of naked condition’ has become a means of protection from 
land ownership challenges and of opening up opportunities, despite the precariousness and 
vulnerability of its population. It is a way of constructing ‘my place’ and of defending ‘our 
place’. Yet it is in relation to the other and through sharing –whatever it may be– that 
citizenship is defined (Balibar 2004). Have not the excluded people of Canaan found a new 
life for themselves in forms of citizenship which, in a formal camp, have been blocked by the 
humanitarian apparatus? 
Written in June 2013 
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